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The matters discussed by defendants in 
their briefp fHed in connection with their 
petition for rehearing, are so largely matters 
rehashed from the original briefs, and mat-
ters which the Court's Opinion indicates has 
received its full attention, that counsel for 
plaintiffs would have submitted the matter 
without brief or argument, except that, per-
haps wrongly, we feel it necessary to direct 
the attention of the Court to some fallacies in 
reasoning here presented. Counsel for defen-
dants have been very persuasive 9 but too 
often that persuasiveness has been based upon 
faulty concepts or misapprehension of the 
testimony. 
Defendants divide their arguments under 
two headings, the one 11 that there was a con-
flict in the medical testimony, the other that 
the Commission was not arbitrary or caprici-
ous in refusing to find as fact the factors which 
the doctors assumed in answering the hypothe-
tical questions proposed. 
The division is somewhat impractical, 
since arbitrariness and capriciousness are 
found here in the attitude of the Commission 
both as to the medical testimony, and as to 
the factual background. In reality~' the argu-
ment should be devoted to the following: 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1 
Was there conflict or contradiction 
either in the medical testimony, or in the 
evidence as to factors upon which that medi-
cal testimony was based which was of substance 
sufficient to prevent the Commission's deci-
sion from being capricious or arbitrary. 
2 
Is it the law, as defendants assume, 
that the power of determining what the evi-
dence shows is solely within the field of the 
Commission? 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1: No substantial conflict 
exists in the evidence. 
Webster's New Twentieth Century 
Dictionary (1950) defines the words "con-
flict" and "contradict" as follows: 
Conflict: To strike or dash against; 
to meet and oppose; to con-
tend; to fight; to strive or 
struggle; to resist or over-
come; to be in opposition; 
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contrary as nthe evidence 
given by the second witness 
conflicted with that given by 
the first. n 
Contradict: To oppose by words; to 
assert the contrary; to deny; 
Syn: Oppose~ gainsays deny, 
resist~ impugn, correct, 
rectify, retract, recant. 
We shall not attempt to rehash at length 
matters which already have been covered by 
prior briefs, as is the situation with so much 
of the matter set out on rehearing. It seems 
evident to us that the members of this Court, 
in their prolonged and searching study of this 
case, must have availed themselves 9 not only 
of matters urged in the brief, but also of the 
transcript of testimony9 and that they are 
familiar with the full text of what was said, 
particularly as to the evidence of the medical 
experts. 
Defendants cite (Br. on Reh. 8} matter 
from the case of 
Morris v. Ind. Com., 90 Utah 256 
61 P. Zd 413 
which in effect gives certain tests which 
must be met before the Commission may be 
reversed. Some of them, in the absence of 
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cont~ntion by defendants that they are appli-
cable, require little attention. For there is 
no question that the evidence uncontradicted 
in this case is not wholly that of interested 
witnesses, or from witnesses showing bias 
or prejudice 9 and it is not suggested by defen-
dants that the presence of the witnesses, in 
the instant case, gave the single member of 
the Commission who heard the testimony 
such an advantage over the Court that the 
Commission's conclusions should not be dis-
turbed. Nor that any other explanation of 
hypotheses accounting for Jones' death 
appear~. In effect defendants do argue that: 
(a) The evidence is contradicted, (b) 
there is matter intrinsically discrediting 
the uncontradicted evidence, and (c) the 
uncon,tradicted evidence is not such as to 
carry a measure of conviction to the reason-
able mind and sustain the burden of proof. 
The effect of the medical testimony 
was argued extensively in the former briefs. 
Nothing· new appears in the brief on rehear-
ing, except the argument that the majority 
opinion of this Court misconstrued the testi-
mony of Dr. Drew Peterson11 giving it an 
"affirmative" construction rather than a 
"negative" one. Also there is a good deal 
of quotation from testimony9 to bolster up 
the prior argument that the testimony of Dr. 
E. D. Zeman and Dr. J. G. Olson, being 
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based upon a hypothetical que stion11 will not 
stand if the facts found by the Commission 
eliminate the basis upon which the testimony 
was given. 
We shall not attempt to rep! y to the 
purported analysis of various questions and 
answers resulting from sparring between 
witness and counsel in cross-examination. 
We assert that the testimony of these physi-
cians boils down to the opinion that the fati ~ 
gue, incident to the previous exertion, with 
little rest, over at least the two days prior 
to July 3rd, plus the exertion of that day p 
alone were adequate to support the belief 
that the occlusion of which Jones died was 
industry connected. We have directed atten-
tion in our former brief to the weight which 
they gave to such additional factors as heat 9 
confined space in which to work, stress 
arising from responsibility for the job, 
work done in a squatting position and so on. 
Neither the majority or minority opinion of 
the Court reflects any doubt that the opinion 
of these witnesses was that factors present 
in Jones• working conditions caused the 
occlusion. 
They gave an explanation for their 
opinion that under these conditions there had 
been built up a debt to nature, as Dr. Zeman 
points out, which created a physiological 
change, as well as built up cumulatively a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
condition equivalent to pronounced overwork 
and over exertion and that the result was an 
anoxia, an insufficient amount of oxygen in 
the blood supplyv resulting in increased 
heart effort which 9 coupled with the narrowed 
arterial condition already existing 9 resulted 
in formation of a clot which choked off the 
coronary artery and caused death. We would 
like to emphasize the findings of the autopsist 
made prior to any controversy arising; that 
he found no rupture of the blood vesseL nor 
any ulceration of the arterial plaques 9 thus 
eliminating other possible causes of the 
occlusion than the one ascribed by these phy-
sicians; and the following significant state-
ment: 
"The relationship of the immediate 
cause of the occlusion is probably 
on the basis of an a:noxia 9 the 
mechanism of which is best corre-
lated from the recent clinical his ... 
tory or environmental relationship. " 
In this case no past clinical history 
appeared 9 but the evidence was full of 
environmental relationships o The evidence 
clearly did not point to any theory or hypo-
thesis, other than the environmental one. 
Equally reasonable in explaining the cause 
of death. 
Conflict in the medical testimony,· if 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
any~ must be found in the evidence of Dr. 
Drew Peterson. The majority opinion 
treats this physician as mildly affirming 
what his fellow experts said. Defendants 
insist somewhat urgently that the Court 
should consider Dr. Peterson's evidence 
as having a "negative" aspect. We think 
the majority opinion makes sense. 
Taking that part of his testimony 
which defendants quote on page 5 of their 
last brief, it is significant that the first 
sentence of Dr. Peterson's answer is a 
complete statement of his position if, and 
if only, he had no opinion one way or the 
other on the relationship between working 
conditions {and the other factors involved) 
and the coronary occlusion- -the position 
defendants contend for on his part. But 
he did not stop there! 
When he went further, he gave an 
opinion. He said that there was possibly 
a relationship. Taken alone 9 that might 
not have meant too much; taken with 
what he said previously, it seems to us 
to show that he wanted to make it clear 
that, in his opinion, the odds favored 
the connection of the occlusion with the 
various work factors shown in the case. 
In effect, he said: 
While it is true that there is so much 
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variation in the authorities that I will not 
dogmatically say that such is the fact 9 
yet it is my opinion that the coronary came 
out of Jones' employment. 
He had already fore shadowed this 
opinion when he testified {Tr. 199 -200) 
that he would warn a man~ whose case his-
tory showed chest pains after climbing 
stairs and who had hypertension, not to 
overexert 9 although he would not tell him, 
"If you exert yourself you will have a 
coronary thrombosis. " The old saying runs: 
"The proof of the pudding is in the eating 
thereof. 11 May we paraphrase it by saying 
that "what the physician warns against 9 he 
fears". 
We submit that there was no substan-
tial conflict or contradiction in the medical 
testimony. 
Defendants less energetically attempt 
to indicate some contradiction in the evi-
dence of the lay witnesses as to their obser-
vations as to the work conditions 9 and what 
they observed as to the decedent's condition. 
Upon that (Br. on Reh. 32 et seq.) they con-
tend the Commission was warranted in 
reaching the conclusion that Jones suffered 
from no unusual strain9 overexertion9 
fatigue or emotional stress. They point to 
minor variances in the testimony to bolster 
up their argument. For instance, because 
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Spencer Porter testified (Tr. 180) that he 
talked with Jones on the morning of his death 11 
discussing the troubles Jones had in getting 
the motor started, without any question 
asked or answer given as to his impression 
of decedent 1s condition11 they would hold the 
Commission entitled to conclude that he 
suffered no more worry, fatigue, exertion9 
that individuals ordinarily are subject to in 
their normal lives. 
Of course the testimony of the wit-
nesses varied. The people called were 
about their own work much of the time on those 
July days a year ago. They testified nearly 
six months after the events of which they told. 
Obviously they were not coached 9 nor did 
they seek to parrot the evidence given by 
other witnesses. But through the whole 
record9 from the witnesses who had seen 
him at work the day he died 9 who had seen 
him at work the day before 9 we get a cumu-
latively outlined picture, uncontradicted in 
substance, of the way he worked, the condi-
tions under which he worked through the long 
hours of overtime which built up that stress of 
overexertion and weariness 9 and the physio-
logical changes from unexpelled fatigue 
poisons which brought on the coronary 
occlusion. 
Defendants have given the Court an 
illustration of "conflict" based upon the 
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witness who could not say that an object 
was round 9 because it was too dark for him 
to see. They apply that principally to the 
medical testimony 9 but as to both fact and 
medical testimony9 we again submit: When 
the other witnesses said the object was 
round, it is not contradiction to say: "I 
don°t know. I could not see it in the dark". 
Men have the sense of touch which advises 
of shape; those whose eyes have adjusted to 
the dark see what the viewer 9 new come 
from a lighted space, finds it impossible to 
perceive. Conflict does not arise except 
where the negative goes beyond mere want 
of knowledge; it must be based upon some-
thing affirmatives it must "deny,oppose 9 
assert the contrary," have substance and 
not shadow. That the man whom Jones 
helped load a truck saw "nothing unusual" 
about him means nothing 9 unless his atten-
tion was directed towards the possibility. 
He knew from his contact with the vinery 
work what was going on there 9 he probably 
expected men working such hours, under 
such conditions to look tired- -that would 
be "nothing unusual. " 
A wall may be built of bricks of 
different size 9 shape or color; there may 
be intersices or broken mortar, but if it 
stands and resists penetration9 it's a wall, 
and it does not fall from criticism of its 
components or of the skill of the builders. 
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To remove its effect as a barrier, it must 
be opposed, battered, shaken by force, 
pushed aside. The wall of fact we have here 
stands; --a wall buttressed not only by the 
psoitive testimony adduced, but also by the 
admissions made by the canning company 
when it put two men on to do what Jones alone 
had been doing 9 when it tore out the sides of 
the vinery to give freer passage to cooling 
air; when it replaced the broken exhaust pipe 
and found and corrected the conditions which 
made the motor balky. 
Before leaving this point 9 we direct 
the attention of the Court to the fact that 
defendants often push their statements as to 
the testimony past the point of accuracy. 
As three examples may we cite: 
The statement (Br. on Reh. 23-35) 
that Jones had some 5 1/2 hours of rest on 
the night of July 2nd. The evidence ( T r. 3 3-
34-35) 9 as we point out on page 23 of our 
original brief 9 was that he had not been able 
to sleep on either the night of the 1st or 2nd, 
had lain in front of the door "for coolness", 
without sleeping 11 until only some 2 to 3 
hours before getting up to go to work at a 
time when people normally are j1illst getting 
started with their night's rest. Now counsel 
say that the Commission was justified in 
dinding that "in view of the fact that he had 
had some five and one -half hours of rest the 
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night before, albeit somewhat restless 
because of the heat, he was not in the con-
dition of fatigue necessary to the conclu-
sions of Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson. " 
(Deft. Br. 35). Nothing said of the fact 
that he had p1J.ll.t in the normal work week of 
40 hours in the three days just preceding, 
nothing of the want of sleep the night before! 
The statement (Deft. B r. 3 5) that his 
work "on this particular day was no more 
arduous and severe than normal during the 
pea run. 11 True enough- -he only was on 
the job some seven hours, a normal day's 
work perhaps, before he sickened and 
died. Nothing is said by defendants of the 
piled up hours of exertion with little rest 
lying behind that day 8s work9 --and that 
situation was not "normal during the pea 
run" when 11 as Plant Superintendent Weathers 
testified (Tr. 177) 9 ttthere would be a rush 
of work and some long hours and we advised 
them (Jones and the other vinery foremen) 
to arrange for two crews and some relief 
for himself." Certainly Jones had had "a 
rush of work and some long hours"· 
The statement (Deft. Br. 21): "As a 
matter of fact 11 other than that it was vsmall', 
the motor isn't even described. 11 We have 
in evidence a sketch and photographs show-
ing the location of this "small" motor. It 
was ''higher than the table" (Tr. 98) 30 to 
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36 inches highp and of substantial ground 
dimensions as shown by the photographs 
of its position.. It was ''small" only in 
relation to the larger motor. 
Again: The medical testimony was 
that the effect of fatigue and exertion upon 
any given individual would vary, and that 
no one can fix in advance the point :where 
any individual would become suqject to 
coronary occlusiono The te stirnony to that 
effect is no more than expert verification 
of what common sense would teach. 11No one 
in the whole worldl) including the dpctors 9 
knows how much effort 9 how much fatigue, 
how much emotional upset was necessary 
to produce a coronary in this individual" 
say defendants in this last brief (Pg. 38) 
and that is not disputable. So, s~y defen-
dants, to conclude that Jones died of a 
coronary occlusion is merely an intelli-
gent guess" 9 a supposition9 and the Corn-
mission being bound to act only upon sub-
stantive evidence 9 not upon conclusions, 
cannot be held to have acted arbitrarily. 
Accept this reasoning 9 and there is 
hardly an instance where judgments 9 de pen-
dent upon expert evidence, could stand. 
The logic behind the position the majority 
opinion takes is practical, and runs some-
thing like this: 
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First: The medical evidence is (and 
common sense teaches us,) that for every 
individual there is a breaking point, a time 
when exertion and fatigue and other environ-
mental fa.ctors 9 excessively prolonged, will 
result in exhaustion of that individual's 
reserves, and then a coronary occlusion is 
one of the likely results. 
Second: Jones 9 while exposed in a 
high degree to conditions naturally causing 
fatigue and overexertion9 and which were 
prolonged for an excess period of time, 
suffered a coronary occlusion, and the evi-
dence affords no explanation of that occur-
renee except that it resulted from the 
recited conditions. 
Third: Jones n death was so industry 
connected as to be compensable. 
This reasoning is along the lines of 
res ipsa loquitur 9 perhaps. But it is the 
reasoning which runs through every case 
where an award has been made as the re-
sult of a coronary occlusion. In no such 
case that we have read and 9 we venture to 
say9 in no case appearing in the books, has 
any per son, expert Qr otherwise te stifled 
to the degree of fatigue 9 or exertion9 or 
stress, or emotion9 which necessarily the 
injured man must sustain before a coronary 
resulted. In no case is it possible! Nor 
er 
ll1 
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is it necessary! The proof necessary to 
e sta.blish the connection between the 
cardiac failure and the overexertion is 
defined in a quotation appearing on page 34 
of our original brief, taken from 
Hammond v. Ind. Co. - 84 Utah 67 
34 P. Zd 687 
"Nor is it necessary that such con-
sequence be shown by direct and 
po~itive testimony. It rna y well be 
shown by facts and circumstances 
which fairly and reasonably point 
to such result and to the exclusion 
of any contrary result equally de-
ductible from the proven facts and 
circumstances. 11 
We submit that the evidence as to the 
environmental factors, the working condi-
tions which preceded death in this case, 
stands without any substantial contradic-
tion; that there is nothing in the record 
intrinsically discrediting it 9 that he was 
convincing and sustained the burden of 
proof9 and that it should have been followed. 
To quote a part of Morris v. Ind. Com. 
(Supra) not found in defendants 1 brief: 
"If the Commission should decide 
against the uncontradicted evidence 
under the conditions, its dec is ion 
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would as a matter of law be arbi-
trary and capricious, which is 
another way of saying that it would 
be unreasonable. " 
Point No. 2. Is it the law, as defen-
dants assume 9 that the power of determin-
ing what the evidence shows is solely 
within the field of the Commission? 
The Commission so asserts in its 
opinion, and the defendants support it. 
The following excerpts illustrate the posi-
tion taken: 
The Commission: 
"The only is sue to be resolved is 
the cause of the occlusion. Was 
it the result of an accident arising 
out of and in the course of employ-
ment? We think it was not. In the 
determination of that question the 
responsibility is upon us to deter-
mine the ultimate fact. " (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The Defendants: 
(Br. on Reh. 9) "Whether those 
facts exist or not is for the Com-
mission to determine. ---The ques-
tion then bee orne s, not whether the 
Commission was arbitrary in 
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declining<to accept the doctors' 
conclusions 9 but whether it was 
arbitrary in failing to accept, 
as established in law, those 
facts upon which the doctors pre-
mised their conclusions. " 
This is to say, while the Commission 
may be bound by expert testimony 9 uncon-
tradicted and based on sound reasoning 9 it 
may refuse to accept as true the evidence, 
equally uncontradicted, equally strong, as 
to the environmental conditions present 9 
and by so doing, in however arbitrary or 
unreasonable a manner, negative the testi-
mony of the experts 11 and escape beyond the 
restraining hand of this Court. 
This argument then is carried on to 
the absurd by the contention that the 
majority opinion denies the Commission 
power to find what the facts are as to 
effort 9 fatigue and stress, and by so doing 9 
in effect 11 holds that "where a coronary 
occurs while an individual is at work, it 
will be conclusively presumed to be indus-
try connected. " 
There is no rule of law which makes 
sacrosanct a finding which is contrary to 
the great weight of uncontradicted fact 9 
and the power of the Commission to pass 
on facts, as this court has repeatedly held, 
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is limited to findings thereon which are 
not unreasonable 9 and so not arbitrary. 
This case presents no new theory of 
liability. Industry will be required to pay 
only when it subjects the employee to work-
ing conditions so severe as to result in 
death or serious disability, and which are 
beyond the normal work exacted of him 9 
and to which he is accustomed. Given 
proof of such conditions 9 which brings con-
viction to the reasonable mind 9 and proof 
from those skilled in the ailments of the 
body that those conditions were of a char-
acter sufficient to cause such death or 
injury9 what public policy is disserved by 
the decision in this case? Certainly not 
the public policy which underlies the 
Workmen's Compensation act--a policy 
which requires industry to bear the burden 
of industrial accidents, and removes that 
burden from the workrn.an9 and his family. 
Factually the Jones case does not 
lend itself to any such interpretation. 
Here the employer itself contemplated 
that such extraordinary hours of work 
and sustained effort as brought about the 
decedentus death were abnormal demands, 
that they would necessitate relief for the 
man performing the job; and itself-
remedied the other conditions which made 
the task so onerous. Yet as we have 
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pointed out, the Commission dismissed 
all this and the other evidence with the 
assertion that 
And 
"If we believe all that evidence we 
must conclude that deceased was 
not subjected to any of these fac-
tors in a degree materially in 
excess of the exertion, etc., to 
which all individuals in every walk 
of life or at home are subjected." 
"There is no evidence of exertion 
or fatigue. " 
Certainly the Commission's posi-
tion does not correctly reflect the law as 
found in the cases of 
Hammond v. Ind. Com. {Supra) 
Robertson v. Ind. Com. - 109 Utah 25 
163 p. 2d. 331 
Dee Memorial Hospital v. Ind. 
Com. 104 Utah 51; 
138 p. 2d. 233 
In two of those cases 9 this Court reversed 
the Commission upon the ground that its 
decisions did not give effect to the uncontra-
dicted testimony and the reasonable infer-
ences therefrom; in the latter 9 . its discus-
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sion of the evidence clearly indicates 
that it did not consider the Commis-
sion's findings as binding. 
The fact is that the Commission 
here has sought to find its way arou..nd 
decisions of this Court which are not 
palatable to it. By the pretense of find-
ing the ultimate fact, it ignores the 
decisions of the Court. The Commission 
concludes that the coronary occlusion 
here occurring was "not the result of an 
accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment" seeking such such 
language to avoid the effect of the 
Hammond, Robertson and Dee Hospital 
cases, which have held cardiac failure, 
contributed to by the conditions and 
activities of decedent within the course 
of his employment, to be an acciden~. 
It then goes on and says: 
ttif the occlusion is determined 
to be an accident, we find that 
the employment had nothing to 
do with the occlusion. " 
Previously it had said that the 
theory of this case was that: 
"All of the surrounding circum-
stances over a period of two or 
three days might have contri-
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buted to the occlusion. This 
theory would charge every 
employer with every occlusion 
(and other ailments) occurring 
on the premises during the hours 
of employment, and for that 
matter occlusions and other ail-
ments which occur off the pre-
m.ises before or after the hours 
of em.ploym.ent if not too remote 
in point of time . rt 
It is not for the Commission to say 
whether or not the law charges the employ-
er with any such liability. I£ 9 as this 
Court has found 9 both here and in its prior 
decisions, it is the law that injuries from. 
prolonged effort 11 stress and strain are as 
compensable as injuries from. immediate 
great effort, stress and strain, the Com-
mission's statement is an attempt to find 
as fact or conclusion of law matter not 
within its purview. That the law is as 
stated 9 see our original brief9 pages 39 to 
42 inclusive. 
Plaintiffs submit that the limits of 
the authority of the Commission have been 
well stated in the opinion of the majority of 
this Court, where Justice Crockett says: 
"If the Commission could go so 
far as to refuse to believe this 
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evidence, in the absence of any-
thing of substance to refute it, 
then it certainly would possess 
arbitrary powers with no effec-
tive review left available to the 
litigant" 11 
Believing that the prevailing opinion 
correctly finds that both factual and opin-
ion evidence are such that the Commission 
acted unreasonably in refusing to find for 
the plaintiffs thereon; and that in so doing, · 
the Commission is not able to cloak its ac-
tions in any shroud of sanctity9 we ask 
that rehearing in this cause be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dobbs and Dobbs 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
By STUART P. DOBBS 
Of Counsel 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
